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Can Freedom of Speech Bear the
Twenty-First Century's Weight?
Lillian R. BeVier*
This Symposium is cast as addressing questions about twentieth century
free speech theory. The Conference brochure announces that "[d]uring the
20th century, the Supreme Court articulated at least three major theories that
undergird the freedoms of speech and press," namely the marketplace of
ideas theory, the self-government theory, and the individual self-realization
theory.' The brochure claims that these "theoretical models have driven the
Court's development and application of... free speech law," and the agenda
it sets is to "examine whether these theoretical models remain valid and
compelling bases for the continued development of free speech law
in... the modem age." 2 More specifically, my fellow panelists and I were
asked to consider whether "[i]n light of the mushrooming costs of running a
political campaign and other dynamics of the modem election
process... free speech theory [should] continue to disfavor campaign
spending limits and strict contribution caps."3  I quote from the brochure
because it seemed to me important to try in my comments to answer the
question that I was asked to address. And the more I thought about the issue
as it was posed for this panel, the more forcefully did it seem to me that the
issue as framed implies deep skepticism about the continuing relevance of
twentieth century theory. It evinces doubt that twentieth century theory
embodies permanent or enduring values. It suggests instead that twentieth
century theory has become outmoded-just as have some twentieth century
* David A. and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor, University of Virginia Law School.
Thanks to Anane Patel, University of Virginia Law School Class of 2010, for research help. These
slightly edited symposium remarks make no claim to either originality or scholarship. They are
more akin to an exhortation, reflecting my judgment that a determined embrace of first principles
might be an appropriate antidote at a symposium with an agenda devoted to questioning their
continuing relevance.
1. Pepperdine University School of Law Presents: Free Speech & Press in the Modern Age:
Can 20th Century Theory Bear the Weight of 21st Century Demands?, http://law.pepperdine.edu/
symposia/freespeech.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009) (Pepperdine Law Review Symposium)
[hereinafter Free Speech].
2. Id.
3. Id.
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technologies, like rotary phones or the VCR. But as so understood, the issue
only intimates the depth of the challenge that the high costs of political
campaigns and "other dynamics" of present day politics pose. That
challenge is not just to twentieth century marketplace, or self-government, or
individual self-realization theories; rather, it is a challenge to political
freedom itself and to free political speech in particular. For it is freedom of
political speech and the doctrines that the Court developed in the twentieth
century to protect that freedom, and not the theories that were offered in
support of them, that modem developments put at risk.4
My central claim in response to the issue that has been posed for this
panel is that free political debate has, in fact, not outlived its usefulness. I
concede that free political debate is under siege, as of course I must in view
of the pressures that ever-more-insistent calls for ever-more-draconian
regulation of campaign finance practices put upon it. But in what follows, I
make three brief points in support of my central claim that if freedom
succumbs to these pressures, it will not be because it has become "outdated"
or that in principle it cannot "bear the weight of 21st century demands."'' It
will be because it will have lost out to the advocates of regulation-or, if
you will, of "reform"--in what has been and will continue to be an ongoing
battle of ideas and values.
First, I will suggest that, for purposes of the campaign finance debate,
what is most relevant about free speech law in the twentieth century are the
doctrines that the Court gradually evolved, beginning with its first
encounters with speech-restricting legislation in the early years and
culminating in three seminal decisions in the 1960s and 1970s. 6 The rules
embodied in these decisions provided free political debate with both direct
and strategic protection from legislative inhibition, threat, or manipulation.
Second, I will suggest that, because the Court perceived that restrictions of
independent campaign expenditures and draconian contribution limits both
aim at and hit free political debate, it announced rules that disfavored them. 7
It did this well-knowing that the costs of political campaigns would continue
to rise. Third, and most important, I will claim that the battle over campaign
finance regulations in the twentieth century was-and in the twenty-first
century continues to be-a debate that will remain relevant and timely
between proponents of freedom of political debate from legislative
4. See infra notes 13-28 and accompanying text (discussing cases that shaped free speech
doctrine).
5. Free Speech, supra note 1.
6. See infra notes 9-26 and accompanying text (discussing early free speech decisions but
designating as three "seminal" cases: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
7. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (discussing decisions examining campaign
finance legislation in light of free speech jurisprudence).
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regulation and advocates of legislative regulation of political debate
(regulation that would reduce freedom in pursuit of other objectives). 8
Because I am a proponent on the freedom side, I will urge the advocates of
regulation to offer more specific descriptions than they have offered to date
of the evils their proposals supposedly cure. I will appeal to them to spell
out more clearly what exactly persuades them that more regulation of the
political process will accomplish the goals they posit for it, and I will ask
them to acknowledge that-and to explain why-they think free political
speech is dispensable.
With respect to my first point, it is of cardinal significance to debates
about the regulation of campaign finance practices that the substantive law
of the First Amendment that the Supreme Court developed in the twentieth
century provided direct and strategic protection to free political debate. 9
Take the Court's word for it: "[T]here is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs."10 It is important, I think, to note that the Court spoke
of protecting "free" political debate, not "intelligent" political debate and not
political debate uninflected with passion or purged of all hints of self- or
special-interest. " A complete summary of the cases which implement this
practically universal agreement is clearly beyond the scope of this essay,12
but several seminal cases so readily come to mind that they deserve mention
here. First were the early cases-Masses,13 Gitlow, 4 and Whitney, 15 for
example-in which Judge Learned Hand (in Masses) and Justices Holmes
and Brandeis (in Gitlow and, most particularly in Whitney) articulated in a
variety of ways a fundamental connection between representative democracy
8. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of political debate versus
regulation of political debate in campaign finance regulation).
9. By direct protection, I refer to protection of political debate from legislation that in terms
prohibits, punishes, or restricts political debate; by strategic protection, I refer to rules regarding the
permissible limits of direct prohibitions, punishments, or restrictions that are deliberately crafted to
minimize the possible chilling effects that any remaining prohibitions, punishments, or restrictions
might have on speech.
10. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
11. Cf, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Campaign Finance Regulation and the Marketplace of
Emotions, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 395 (2009) (implicitly claiming that political speech that is animated by
emotion instead of reason ought to be susceptible to regulation).
12. See Geoffrey Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: What We Learned in the
Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 273 (2009) (summarizing ten judgments about the meaning of
the First Amendment made in the 20th century).
13. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
14. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
15. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
and free political debate. 16 Justices Holmes and Brandeis, moreover, made a
point of insisting that the Court had an indispensable role to play in
protecting free political speech from over-wrought legislative efforts to
regulate it and that the Court had a constitutional obligation to decide
whether the particular speech that the government sought to punish in a
particular case had created a sufficiently clear and present danger of
substantive evil that it could be punished consistently with the commands of
the First Amendment.' 7 Their efforts bore final fruit in Brandenburg v.
Ohio,' 8 in which the Court announced a hard and fast rule that precluded
states from even "forbid[ding] or proscrib[ing]"-much less from
punishing-"advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action." 19  Thus, the Court in
Brandenburg announced a rule that, in order to protect the kind of political
speech that was most important, deliberately left some dangerous, probably
unintelligent and perhaps irrational, speech unpunished and unpunishable.2°
And with Brandenburg, the Court steadfastly embraced a First Amendment
tradition that had been developing since Justices Holmes and Brandeis first
signaled its birth: a tradition of the Court announcing and applying
intentionally speech-protective rules.
Another seminal case along these lines is, of course, New York Times v.
Sullivan,2 in which the Court, for plainly strategic reasons, offered
constitutional protection to false statements of fact about public officials in
the performance of their public duties. The protection for false speech was
necessary, the Court thought, to protect "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
debate on public issues.22 More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that in the
Times case the Court delivered, in no uncertain terms, a belated death-knell
to the Sedition Act of 1789, "because ... the restraint it imposed upon
16. Cf Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment:
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990) (Hand's reliance on democratic
theory in Masses, and the premises from which he reasoned, became "basic, though often
unacknowledged, features of modem [F]irst [A]mendment analysis," and had a "pervasive,
and.., profound" influence on Justices Holmes and Brandeis, among others.).
17. These latter points were a major implication of the disagreement between Justices Holmes
and Brandeis, and Justice Sanford's opinion for the majority in both Gitlow and Whitney. Moreover,
when Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951), noted that by that time there
was "little doubt that subsequent opinions [to Gitlow and Whitney] [had] inclined toward the
Holmes-Brandeis rationale," he was clearly referring to the Holmes-Brandeis view of the Court's
role in policing the application of the clear and present danger test to make sure it conformed to First
Amendment imperatives.
18. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
19. Id. at 447.
20. Id. at 447-48.
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. Id. at 270.
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criticism of government and public officials was inconsistent with the First
Amendment.
23
My final example of the Court's commitment in the twentieth century to
keeping government within stringent limits when it attempts to suppress
particular forms of public discourse about public affairs is Cohen v.
California,24 the case in which the Court famously overturned a conviction
for wearing a jacket with "FUCK THE DRAFT" emblazoned on the back.
In doing so, the Court acknowledged that free public discussion may indeed
produce "verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance, 25 but it
embraced such results because it thought them "in truth necessary side
effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate
permits us to achieve. 2 6
My second point is that the Court in the twentieth century (and early in
the twenty-first) concluded that restrictions of independent expenditures and
draconian limits on contributions to political candidates both aim at and hit
free political debate. I do not here intend to offer a rehash of the long-
standing debate about this conclusion.2 7 The Court quite unequivocally held
in Buckley v. Valeo that "contribution and expenditure limitations operate in
an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." 21 It recently
reaffirmed this conclusion with respect to contributions, in Randall v.
Sorrell,29 and with respect to expenditures in Federal Election Commission
v. Wisconsin Right to Life.3° I acknowledge that advocates of regulation
continue to make variations of the argument that such restrictions are merely
regulations of "money ' '31 or "property ' 32 or "conduct"" or of "devices of
23. Id. at 276.
24. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
25. Id. at 24-25.
26. Id. at 25.
27. See Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1055-1060 (1985) (summarizing and
responding to arguments that campaign giving and spending limitations do not involve important
First Amendment concerns because they regulate only conduct and do not regulate speech directly).
28. 424 U.S. 1, 14(1976).
29. 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
30. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
31. See, e.g., J. Skelley Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J.
1001, 1005-06 (giving money to and spending money on political debate are forms of conduct
related to speech and not pure speech).
32. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Money is property; it is not speech.").
33. See, e.g., Brief for Senators Hugh Scott and Edward M. Kennedy as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 24, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (limitations on
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democracy" akin to such strategies for coordinating democratic processes as
polling places and dates for elections.34 They insist that such restrictions
represent relatively insignificant incursions on First Amendment values. I
insist to the contrary that though it is true that contribution and expenditure
limitations literally aim at and hit only "money" or "property" or the
"conduct" or the "device of democracy" of giving or spending money or
property, the more salient fact about them is that the money or property or
device that they aim at-and hit, to the extent the Court sustains them-is
exclusively and designedly that which is given to or spent on or engaged in
with reference to the conduct of "discussion of public issues and debate on
the qualifications of candidates [which] are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our Constitution., 35 Moreover, like
the Court in Buckley, I do not doubt that "the constitutional guarantee [of
free political debate] has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to
the conduct of campaigns for political office. 36
My third point is not a controversial one-at least I hope it is not
controversial-since it purports to do no more than describe what the battle
over the First Amendment and campaign finance regulations has always
been and continues to be, at bottom, all about. My characterization of what
is and has been at stake is at least a plausible one, despite its being painted
here with a broad brush and without analytical nuance. Fundamentally, the
battle is between two very different world views, two ways of understanding
our political system and of thinking about the power and capacity of the
legislature to reconfigure its workings. I have previously noted that the two
sides of this debate at present occupy "no common First Amendment
ground. '37  On one side of the debate are those who think both that
freedom-negative freedom, that is-works, that it is a constitutional value
of enduring significance, and that legislators are more inclined to regulate
politics so as to protect incumbents rather than to encourage genuine
political competition. 38  These advocates believe that freedom of political
speech necessarily includes freedom to spend money to support candidates
and discuss issues.3 9 On the other side of the First Amendment chasm are
campaign contributions and expenditures "deal only with conduct, [or] with the transfer or use of
money or other material resources").
34. See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1326 (1994).
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. I have defended my conclusion on this point elsewhere, and I will
insist on this point rather than undertaking to defend it again here. See BeVier, supra note 28, at
1055-60.
36. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
37. Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life, 2006-07 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 77, 106 (2007).
38. Id. at 107.
39. Id. at 110.
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those who, with respect to the political process, are suspicious of the value
of freedom as it is traditionally understood,4 ° who think that legislators
ought to be entitled to considerable deference when they pass legislation
under the banner of "reform" of the political system, and who believe that
electoral politics can and ought to be made to work more rationally and more
fairly.4 ' These advocates support and defend regulations of campaign
contributions and expenditures because, though such regulations reduce
freedom, they believe that the regulations pursue objectives that they deem
more worthy.42 They think freedom undermines the accomplishment of
these objectives; whereas appropriate, well-designed regulations can
effectuate them-objectives such as the prevention of corruption and the
appearance of corruption,43 equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections,"4 and attaining "political
integrity., 45 The latter objective is one which, according to Justice Souter is
"second to none in a free society. 46
The freedom of political speech that I think is at stake is, quite simply,
the absence of regulations or laws that explicitly either restrict the
citizenry's ability to spend or contribute money to express its views about
candidates and issues or regulate the content of what may be said.47 While
one might take the position-and many do-that democracy is enhanced by
40. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Symposium Commentary: Taking Issue with Issue Advocacy, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1793, 1793 (1999) ("The maximization of negative liberty ... is not an attractive normative
benchmark.").
41. See BeVier, supra note 37, at 110.
42. Id.
43. Here, "corruption" refers to the corruption of candidates "too compliant" with the wishes of
particular constituents, or of an electoral process itself which may become distorted by "the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth." Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (noting that preventing corruption is "a concern not confined to
bribery of public officials, but [one that extends] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors"); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990).
44. See, e.g., Burt Neubome, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 789, 801 (1998) (asserting that participation of the wealthy in election campaigns
ought to be limited in order to assure the "optimal operation of" our electoral process).
45. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2689 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
46. Id. There is irony in Justice Souter's claim that it is "political integrity," and not freedom
itself, that has value "second to none in a free [free?] society."
47. Cf Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political and
Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1762-64 (1999) (describing negative freedom and
contrasting it with the First Amendment conception that understands the Constitution to confer
power on legislatures to attempt to maximize "rational democratic deliberation among political
equals in disinterested pursuit of the public interest").
restricting free political speech in a variety of ways,48 the meaning that I
embrace rejects the claim that freedom can be enhanced by being
restricted.4 9 Anyway, it does not seem to me that "freedom" is, on the face
of it, an ambiguous term-at least as the term is traditionally understood.
Thus, I do not think that I need further to clarify the reality to which I refer
by my claim that "freedom" is the value embraced by those on one side of
the campaign finance debate.
I do, however, think that the terms deployed by the advocates of
regulation, who are on the other side, require clarification. The terms they
use are rhetorically evocative, to be sure, and they imply that those who use
them occupy the moral high ground. The precise nature of the reality to
which they refer is, to say the least, hard to pin down. Considering, for
example, the menu of evils identified by so-called reform advocates,
question after question about what it is exactly that they seek to correct
comes to mind. Let me offer just a few examples of the things that puzzle
me. Reform advocates speak disparagingly of politicians who are "too
compliant" with the wishes of particular constituents,5" but their disparaging
tone is an insufficient answer to the many questions that the very notion of
being "too compliant" raises. Left wholly unspecified is what, exactly, it
means to say that a politician is "too compliant" with some contributors'
wishes. The idea of being "too compliant" with some constituents suggests
that a politician ought to be more compliant with other constituents. But
who or what those others might be is not identified. It is unclear whether a
politician thought to be "too compliant" with one group of constituents is
being compared to the general notion that faithful agency requires
compliance with the wishes of all constituents, or is being compared to a
politician who is "too compliant" with the wishes of a specific group of
constituents rather than "just compliant enough." The reformers do not
indicate how one would know when the Goldilocks "just right" amount of
compliance has been achieved. Or consider the majority of the Court's
description of corruption as "not only.., quidpro quo agreements, but also
as undue influence on an officeholder's judgment."5 1 Again, the disparaging
tone with reference to undue influence masks a number of issues of
definition and criteria. It is easy to oppose the exercise of "undue
48. See, e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 84 (1993) ("[C]ampaign finance laws
might be thought to promote the purpose of the system of free expression, which is to ensure a well-
functioning deliberative process among political equals.").
49. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1135 (2d ed. 1988) ("If the net
effect of the legislation is to [enhance freedom of speech], then the exacting review reserved for
abridgments of free speech may be inapposite.").
50. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
51. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n, 533 U.S. 431, 441
(2001).
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influence," but considerably more difficult to determine which factors render
any particular amount of influence "undue," and to describe the source and
amount of influence that would be "just right." If large contributions have
influence that is "undue," the question arises of "undue as compared to
what?" The reformers do not clarify whether the relevant measure of the
influence is the size of the contributions, or the sources of the political
influence-such as media coverage, celebrity endorsements, or "elite
opinion" on certain issues. It is possible that the reformers mean to imply
that the influence of large contributions will overbear the influence of the
officeholder's own philosophical commitments, or her perception of what
would best serve the interests of her constituents. But if this is their
implication, they do not make it clear.
Finally, at least for the moment, the vision of "political integrity" that
Justice Souter invokes begs for clarification. 52 He does not specify what he
denotes when he speaks of political integrity, nor does he articulate what it is
about devoting "money in self-interested hands to the support of political
campaigning," that subverts it.53 One wonders whether Justice Souter thinks
that political integrity would be undermined by the simple fact of self-
interest on the part of participants in political campaigns. The question
arises whether he believes that the expenditure of money in "publicly-
interested hands" would not subvert democracy to the extent that money in
self-interested hands does. And this question in turn raises the issue of who
decides whether money comes from "publicly-interested" or "privately-
interested" hands. Another possibility suggests itself, however, which is that
in Justice Souter's view devoting money-any kind of money, from any
kinds of hands-to the support of political campaigning subverts political
integrity. So that insofar as freedom itself consists of freedom to spend and
contribute money to "the support of political campaigning," it is freedom
itself that subverts political integrity.
To raise issues of definition, specification, and criteria that the rhetoric
of reform leaves unanswered is not a mere academic sport. The questions
are not mere quibbles. Instead they focus on crucial statements by Justices
who have in the past voted to sustain campaign finance regulations, and they
need to be asked of and answered by twenty-first century reformers for two
reasons. One reason is that it is a near certainty that more regulations will be
52. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2689 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id.
53. Id.
proposed in the coming years. A second reason is that the "reforms" that
were enacted in the twentieth century have not had unequivocally benign
effects on the political process. Far from it, despite Justice Stevens's
confident insistence that Congress in the twentieth century is engaged in
"steady improvement of the national election laws. 54  Indeed, the way
politics is conducted today is, in many of its least attractive respects, a
function of those very reforms. Last century's increasingly stringent
regulations on political giving and spending strengthened the hand of
Washington-based interest groups, protected incumbent officeholders from
harsh criticism by independent groups, and made it harder than ever for
effective challenges to be mounted against them because regulations made it
more difficult to raise money-and anything that makes it more difficult to
raise money bears more heavily on challengers than on incumbents. In
addition, the regulations created a separate special-interest class of lawyers
and advisers savvy about the maze of regulations, about what it takes to
comply with them, and how to find the loopholes. This is a class of people
whose comparative advantage now lies in their specialized expertise about
this arcane body of rules and whose self-interest, accordingly, lies in the
continuation-and perhaps even in the prospect of increasing the
complexity--of today's regulatory regime. Whatever benign effects they
may have had in addition to these malign ones, the regulations have done
next to nothing to get the money out of politics. They have merely
rechanneled its flow so that now it comes from less, rather than more
accountable sources.55 It has been reported, for example, that spending by
independent Section 527 organizations could exceed $1 billion in 2008 for
the first time in our history.56 This latter reality should surprise no one.
With a federal budget topping 3 trillion dollars and representing more than
20% of the GNP,57 a health care crisis looming, the government's fingers in
every domestic pie, a war being waged, and an unrelenting threat from
terrorists bent on our destruction, the stakes have never been higher in the
struggle for political power. In fact, considering the magnitude and
importance of what is at stake in election contests, I wonder why fingers
keep getting pointed at campaign spending and contributions as if these were
motivated by wholly exogenous concerns rather than being a reflection of
the enormity and variety of the issues confronting us. It seems plausible to
54. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 117 (2003).
55. See, e.g., Rick Hampson, George Soros Putting His Fortune Behind a New Cause: Ousting
Bush, USA TODAY, June 1, 2004, at IA; Matthew Mosk, ACT Fined $775,000, WASH. POST, Aug.
30, 2007, at A05.
56. See, e.g., T.W. Farnam & Brody Mullins, Interest-Group Campaign Spending Nears Record:
Figure for First Time Could Top SI Billion; IRS Reports on 527s, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2008, at Al 3.
57. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES Gov'T, FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2007).
424
[Vol. 36: 415, 2009] Can Freedom of Speech Bear the 21st Century's Weight
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
me that ever-increasing campaign expenditures and contributions are instead
a quite predictable result of a government grown so big and so pervasive that
it is worth spending resources to influence the outcomes of elections and
thereby affect the future course of the nation."8
In fact, what I wish I could understand is what it is about freedom-
meaning freedom from government regulation-that advocates of regulation
find so repugnant, so expendable. Perhaps they would be loathe to
acknowledge that they find freedom repugnant in principle, but when they
describe the world they see for what freedom has wrought, they seem
appalled.5 9 And, while they are no doubt unwilling to jettison it entirely, the
regulators clearly do not give freedom priority in their scale of values.6 °
They are willing to trade large amounts of it in exchange for other objectives
that they deem more worthy-again, to quote Justice Souter, it is "political
integrity [and not free political debate that has] a value second to none in a[n
otherwise] free society. ' 6 1
I now offer my answer to the question of whether the twentieth century
doctrines that the Court announced to provide both direct and strategic
protection to free political debate have become outdated. These, of course,
are the doctrines that the Court has deployed to strike down at least some
restrictions of independent campaign expenditures and draconian
contribution limitations, so the question really is: Has free political debate
itself outlived its usefulness? And my answer is this: Freedom does not have
a sell-by date. Freedom is a value we will either continue to embrace--or
not. If we continue to embrace it, we must become comfortable with-or at
least tolerant of-"the mushrooming costs of running a political campaign
and other dynamics of the modem election process. 62 We will have to live
with a political process that is messy, vibrant, volatile, sometimes ugly and
often irrational, nearly always unpredictable, and-perhaps most
disconcerting-not within our control, and quite beyond our power to tame.
58. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 41
(1992) (arguing that the best way to cure the problem of money in politics is to restrain the growth of
government and thereby reduce the returns to rent-seeking).
59. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. CR.-C.L. L.
REV 1, 34 (1998) (asserting that the "dismal state of public discourse within existing electoral
campaigns needs little demonstration").
60. Id. ("The primary purpose of electoral campaigns... 'is to elect public officials, not to serve
as a general forum for political expression."' (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520
U.S. 351, 373 (1997) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting))).
61. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2689 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
62. Free Speech, supra note 1.
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The struggle between political freedom and the urge to regulate has been
going on for a long time. If in the twenty-first century we decide to trade
more of our freedom for more regulation, it will not be "new and
unprecedented demands" that Will cause us to do so. Rather, it will be
because the determined, politically astute, and dedicated commitments of the
advocates for regulation win the day. They will have convinced us that
values other than freedom are second to none in a free society. But make no
mistake: If the advocates of regulation succeed, it will not be because they
brought new twenty-first century ideas about the need for regulation to the
table to trump old and outdated ideas of freedom of speech. It will be
because, in the free marketplace of ideas, their ideas triumph over the idea of
freedom.
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